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I. Introduction
In 2011, an infant, whom I will call Gary,1 was born in New
York.2 Gary was born in and lived in a rental apartment in New
York with his mother and father for the first year of his life.3 The
1. As the source for this introduction is a civil action on behalf of an
anonymous child, a name has been given for narrative clarity.
2. See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 92 F. Supp. 3d 53, 60 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“On
August 1, 2011, Hernandez-Adams gave birth to plaintiff G.M.M. in her ground
floor apartment.”).
3. See id. at 56 (“Plaintiffs Niki Hernandez-Adams and her son G.M.M.
(“plaintiffs”) are both currently Texas residents and former tenants of 490
Macdonough Street, Brooklyn, New York 11233.”).
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young couple chose the apartment as a wonderful place to house
themselves, their two dogs, and their expected child.4 Gary was
developing well and could be found crawling around the home
that he shared with his parents and their two dogs.5 During his
first-year medical check-up, however, Gary’s doctor discovered
that he had an exceptionally high blood-lead level of nine
grams/deciliter.6 On the advice of Gary’s doctor, Gary’s mother
had the apartment tested for lead paint.7 The test revealed
concerning levels of lead-contaminated dust throughout the unit.8
Approximately one month after learning the results of the lead
paint test, Gary and his parents moved out of the apartment;
Gary, however, did not escape the effects of the contamination.9
An evaluation of Gary when he was three years old revealed
numerous behavioral and cognitive issues.10 A licensed
psychologist found “deficits in the areas of expressive language,
attention and concentration, short-term memory and behavioral
difficulties [that were] casually related to [Gary’s] high lead levels
between the critical ages of 1–2.”11 The evaluation revealed
4. See id. at 59 (“We needed a yard. We needed a garden. So that was
primarily why we looked at that apartment. . . . We have two dogs. So we
needed a backyard for them. . . . We were very happy and we loved [the]
apartment. We liked the layout. We liked the location.” (citing Mendez June
Dep. 15:3–5) (alterations in original)).
5. See id. at 59–60 (describing G.M.M.’s first year of life in the
apartment).
6. See id. at 60 (noting G.M.M.’s blood-lead levels); CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, BLOOD LEAD LEVELS IN CHILDREN 1–2 (2015)
(explaining that parents must be notified if a child has blood-lead levels of 5
micrograms per deciliter, that 10 micrograms per deciliter is a level of concern,
and that chelation therapy is recommended if the blood-lead levels are over 45
micrograms per deciliter).
7. See Kimpson, 92 F. Supp. 3d at 61 (describing the testing in G.M.M.’s
apartment)).
8. See id. (explaining that half of the samples taken contained
lead-contaminated dust above permissible levels).
9. See id. (noting that lead test results were given to Hernandez-Adams
on September 12, 2012, and the family moved out of the apartment and to Texas
in October 2012).
10. See id. at 61–62 (noting that a neuropsychological evaluation
administered on April 24, 2014, revealed “impairments and cognitive limitations
secondary to lead poisoning”).
11. Id. at 62.
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various enduring problems such as Expressive Language
Disorder, Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder, and
emotional, cognitive, and behavioral issues.12 Gary’s parents
brought a civil suit against the landlord.13 Gary was suing for
direct medical damages from his ingestion of lead dust, as well as
lost future earnings because of the reduction in his future
prospects due to the cognitive and behavioral challenges the lead
contamination caused.14
Cases like Gary’s are common. The recent case of lead in the
Flint, Michigan water supply serves as a stark reminder.15 When
an individual is injured, the plaintiff seeks damages in part to
make herself whole, or to put her in a position as if the injury had
not occurred.16 Personal injury cases thus seek to fairly and
accurately compensate a victim for the actual damages the
tortfeasor caused.17 In many cases, the actual damage caused is
uncertain.18 This is true, for example, where a child is injured
and it is unclear where life would have taken her,19 where a
12. See id. at 62 (describing G.M.M.’s difficulty communicating, focusing,
learning, and functioning).
13. See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(noting that G.M.M.’s mother filed the suit).
14. See id. (“A critical factor in determining damages required ascertaining
the infant’s prospects for obtaining postsecondary education degrees had he not
suffered from lead poisoning.”).
15. See Sara Ganim & Linh Tran, How Tap Water Became Toxic in Flint,
Michigan, CNN (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/11/health/toxictap-water-flint-michigan/ (last visited June 5, 2016) (discussing the leadpoisoned tap water in Flint) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
see also infra Part V.C (explaining the lead contaminated water situation in
Flint, Michigan, and how a statute could help manage the various claims).
16. See United States v. Denver, 547 F.2d 1101, 1105 (10th Cir. 1977)
(“[T]he fundamental principle of damages is to restore the injured party, as
nearly as possible, to the position he would have been in had it not been for the
wrong of the other party.” (citation omitted)).
17. See Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 16 (2d Cir.
1996) (noting that a tortfeasor’s misconduct is irrelevant for calculating
compensatory damages because such damages are meant only to compensate
the plaintiff).
18. See Clinchfield R.R. Co. v. Forbes, 417 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1966) (“[I]t has been said that testimony tending to establish the future earning
capacity of any person is necessarily speculative.”).
19. See, e.g., Childs v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 1570, 1572–73 (S.D. Ga.
1996) (calculating damages to be paid to the estate a six-year-old child who was
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plaintiff was in college at the time of injury,20 or where an
employed plaintiff may or may not be promoted in the future.21
Injuries often deprive individuals of future earning potential.22
When there is a lack of evidence regarding current earnings,
courts cannot be certain about future earnings.23 Even when an
individual introduces evidence of current earnings, courts must
make educated guesses about potential promotions, work-life
expectancy, and other unknowns.24
To assist in these projected future earnings, courts use U.S.
Department of Labor lifetime earnings studies, Census Bureau
statistics, and mortality and work-life expectancy tables.25 The
killed in an automobile accident by examining the likelihood the child would
attend college and speculating on life expectancy).
20. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reese, 425 P.2d 465, 467 (Okla.
1967) (examining how damages should be calculated for a woman who “had been
unable to return to school and complete her course of study in the operation of
business machines”).
21. See, e.g., Childs, 923 F. Supp. at 1574, 1576 (finding that a woman
killed in a car accident “could have advanced into upper management in [her]
company,” and that her damages should account for regular raises at her job).
22. See Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 196 Cal. Rptr. 117, 143 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (“Impairment of the capacity or power to work is an injury separate from
the actual loss of earnings. . . . The plaintiff may recover even where she was not
working and earned nothing.”).
23. See Oliveri v. Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., 849 F.2d 742, 745 (2d Cir. 1988)
(“The admissibility of evidence regarding future earning capacity is within the
wide discretion of the trial judge.”).
24. See, e.g., Giza v. BNSF Ry. Co., 843 N.W.2d 713, 722–23 (Iowa 2014)
(finding that generalized tables and evidence of typical retirement age can be
presented to a jury).
25. See, e.g., Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir.
1996) (finding that an expert’s testimony was properly admitted where it was
based on “accepted work-life tables published by the Department of Labor” for
use in work-life expectancy calculation); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Sutton, 765
So. 2d 1269, 1276–77 (Miss. 2000) (“[W]e hold . . . where there is no past income
upon which to base a calculation of projected future income, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the deceased child’s income would have been the
equivalent of the national average as set forth by the United States Department
of Labor.”); Jones v. Eppler, 266 P.2d 451, 456 (Okla. 1953) (“[T]he weight of
authority is that standard life and annuity tables . . . are admissible in evidence
in personal injury cases . . . of the earning capacity of the person negligently
injured.”); Niles v. City of San Rafael, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733, 739 (Cal. App. 1974)
(relying on a study of national average lifetime income the Department of Labor
compiled in a case involving an eleven-year-old who was paralyzed).
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Department of Labor lifetime earnings studies and Census
Bureau statistics use factors such as race, ethnicity, and gender.26
Economists and other experts often rely on such race-, ethnicity-,
and gender-based statistics (minority-based statistics) in
calculations of lost earning capacity.27 As one expert noted,
experts are meant to assist a factfinder, and despite performing
“thousands of lost income analyses . . . no one had ever asked him
to provide race- and sex-neutral calculations in wrongful death
cases.”28 In recent years, however, courts have provided
minority-neutral jury instructions and required experts to utilize
minority-neutral factors for determinations of lost future
earnings.29 Scholarship has also examined whether courts should
consider race, ethnicity, or gender for individual tort cases,

26. See
Race,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/topics/population/race.html (last visited June 5, 2016)
(“The Census Bureau collects race data according to U.S. Office of Management
and Budget guidelines, and these data are based on self-identification.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
27. See, e.g., O’Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 1959)
(explaining that a white male was entitled to have his life expectancy based on
the average for white males, rather than life expectancy based on the general
populace); In re Air Crash Near Nantucket Island, 462 F. Supp. 2d 360, 362–63
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining that the victim would have provided monetary
support to his parents for the remainder of their lives with a longer life
expectancy for the mother based gender-based life expectancy tables); Athridge
v. Iglesias, 950 F. Supp. 1187, 1192–93 (D.D.C. 1996) (relying on statistical
earnings of an average white male who attended college to determine the lost
future earnings of a white high school male injured in a car accident).
28. United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1315 (D. Utah 2004),
aff’d sub nom. United States v. Serawop, 410 F.3d 656 (10th Cir. 2005).
29. See United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1126–27 (10th Cir. 2007)
(finding that the lower court acted correctly in eliminating minority-based
statistics from consideration for restitution out of concern of fairness when the
expert wished to utilize race- and gender-based statistics); Childs v. United
States, 923 F. Supp. 1570, 1580 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (explaining that race-dependent
statistical tables are less reliable and ignore individuals’ “respective
backgrounds” and that race-neutral factors are a more reliable source for lost
future income calculations); Wheeler Tarpey-Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp.
427, 455 (D.D.C. 1991) (rejecting the argument that income statistics for black
men should be used for a half-black, half-white child, as “it would be
inappropriate to incorporate current discrimination” into lost future earnings
and instead using average earnings of all individuals), rev’d, 28 F.3d 120 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
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regardless of their reliability.30 One scholar has even argued that
the use of minority-based statistics violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31 This trend recently
culminated in a federal court decision that found that the use of
race- and ethnicity-based statistics is unconstitutional.32
This Note examines the arguments for and against the use of
minority-based statistics in future lost earnings determinations.
The trend in recent years has been against the use of such
statistics.33 While this Note opposes using minority-based
statistics to calculate damages, it contends that their use is
constitutional. In contrast to other scholarship on the issue, this
Note argues that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply because experts’ use of minoritybased statistics does not constitute state action. Although a better
argument arises under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the use of minority-based statistics34 does not
30. See Laura Greenberg, Comment, Compensating the Lead Poisoned
Child: Proposals for Mitigating Discriminatory Damage Awards, 28 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 429, 430 (2001) (arguing against “dependence on race-based
statistics” because they “assume[] that race is and should be the primary
determinant of individual achievement,” and arguing that courts should use
race-neutral statistics and consider factors that “increase the likelihood of
[children] overcoming adverse situations”); Sherri R. Lamb, Note, Toward
Gender-Neutral Data for Adjudicating Lost Future Earning Damages: An
Evidentiary Perspective, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 299, 299 (1996) (arguing for
gender-neutral statistics where “there is no earning pattern on which to base as
individualized determination of lost future earning potential”).
31. See Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and
Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument,
63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 77 (1994) (arguing that the use of race- and genderbased data in tort cases constitutes state action that violates “the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection”); see generally JENNIFER B. WRIGGENS & MARTHA
CHAMALLAS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 155–82
(2010) (discussing the impact that race, gender, and ethnicity have had on tort
law generally and on damage determinations).
32. See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“The
use of race-based statistics to obtain a reduced damage award—which is now
extended to the use of ethnicity-based statistics, to calculate future economic
loss—is unconstitutional.”).
33. See infra Part III (discussing emerging trends).
34. See infra Part IV.C.1 (arguing that procedural due process is not
violated because the applicability of minority-based statistics is fully
adjudicated in a trial).
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violate procedural due process.35 Their use does, however, deprive
minorities and women of their autonomy and right to chart their
own course in life, which arguably violates substantive due
process.36 Nonetheless, the due process argument does not apply
to minority-based statistics because there is no state action and
substantive due process is a questionable doctrine.37 This Note
proposes a federal statutory Fair Experts Act, similar to the Civil
Rights Acts of 1964.38 A statutory framework limiting the kind of
information experts may use provides a better and more feasible
solution for excluding minority-based statistics from court cases.39
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 allowed courts to combat
discrimination against private individuals and regulated private
conduct.40 This Note maintains that a Fair Experts Act will
similarly combat problematic private conduct by experts in tort
litigation.41 Finally, this Note applies the proposed Fair Experts

35. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“Procedural due
process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive
individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”).
36. See infra Part IV.C.2 (arguing that minority-based statistics fail to
account for individual autonomy and potentially violate substantive due
process).
37. See infra Part IV.C.2 (explaining that the existence of substantive due
process is questionable and due process is susceptible to state action concerns).
38. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
39. See infra Part V.B (arguing for a Fair Experts Act).
40. The Civil Rights Act of 1964:
[E]nforced the constitutional right to vote, conferred jurisdiction upon
the district courts of the United States, provided injunctive relief
against discrimination in public accommodations, authorized the
Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in
public facilities and public education, extended the Commission on
Civil Rights, prevented discrimination in federally assisted programs,
and established a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity.
Civil
Rights
Act
of
1964,
THE
NAT’L
ARCHIVES
CATALOG,
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/299891 (last visited June 5, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
41. See infra Part V.A (examining congressional power to regulate private
conduct and its ability to enforce constitutional rights without depending on the
Constitution).
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Act to claims arising from tap water contamination in Flint,
Michigan.42
Part II examines the argument in favor of using
minority-based statistics to calculate future lost earnings, case
law, and the underlying principles supporting their use.43 Future
earnings calculations are necessarily speculative—courts must
help decide an unknown future, often with little information.44
Allowing experts to use minority-based statistics allows a
defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s evidence.45 Part III discusses
emerging case law finding minority-based statistics unreliable.46
This Part examines the arguments against minority-based
statistics, including the effect of past inequality.47 Part III also
discusses the arguments surrounding claims that minority-based
statistics often fail to account for an individual’s ability to
overcome and succeed past expectations.48 Part IV examines the
arguments for a constitutional bar on the use of minority-based
statistics in tort cases under the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.49 Part V offers a

42. See infra Part V.C (applying Fair Experts Act to hypothetical plaintiff
from Flint, Michigan, and explaining how traditional minority-based statistics
would lead to unfair results).
43. See infra Part II (explaining that principles underlying tort law, such
as making plaintiff whole and holding tortfeasors accountable only for damages
they inflicted, has shaped the use of minority-based statistics).
44. See Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670, 677 (Va. 1990) (“Estimates of
damages based entirely upon statistics and assumptions are too remote and
speculative . . . such evidence must be grounded upon facts specific to the
individual whose loss is being calculated.”).
45. See Giza v. BNSF Ry. Co., 843 N.W.2d 713, 732 (Iowa 2014) (explaining
that a defendant would be “defenseless” if not allowed to present data based on
typical retirement age).
46. See infra Part III (noting a trend in case law over the past few decades
to limit or eliminate the use of minority-based statistics).
47. See infra Part III (explaining that minority-based statistics are often
based on economic data that reflects biases and reinforce inequality).
48. See Greenberg, supra note 30, at 430–31 (arguing that “experts should
start from the optimistic assumption that children are, in fact, able to overcome
obstacles that confront them”).
49. See infra Part IV (examining arguments that minority-based statistics
are unconstitutional and arguing that such arguments fail to consider state
action and the adversarial nature of expert testimony).
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statutory alternative to the constitutional bar.50 This Part argues
that a federal statute limiting experts’ use of minority-based
statistics is within Congress’s power and ensures fair and equal
treatment of all individuals.51
II. Experts Typically Use Minority-Based Statistics and the
Underlying Principles of Tort Law Arguably Support Such Use
Important and often conflicting goals govern tort law. On the
one hand, a core purpose of tort law is to make a plaintiff whole
by putting her in the same—or as close to the same—position as
she was in before the injury, so far as money can.52 On the other
hand, tort law requires that defendants pay only for damages
that they actually caused.53
One argument in favor of the use of minority-based statistics
claims that these statistics ensure that a defendant compensates
the plaintiff in the amount he would have actually earned absent
the injury.54 The problem is that injured individuals often lack
any evidence relating to current earnings or actual losses, either
50. See infra Part V (arguing for a Fair Experts Act).
51. See infra Part V (explaining that Congress has broad power under the
Commerce Clause to regulate private individuals).
52. See Jill Weber Lens, Honest Confusion: The Purpose of Compensatory
Damages in Tort and Fraudulent Misrepresentation, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 231, 235
(2011) (“The aim of compensatory damages is to put the injured party ‘in a
position substantially equivalent in a pecuniary way to that which he would
have occupied had no tort been committed,’ thus making the plaintiff whole.”
(citations omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 1979))).
53. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931)
(explaining that, without damage limits, individuals may face liability for “an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class”).
54. See, e.g., O’Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 1959)
(explaining that, if the factfinder is using U.S. Life Tables to determine life
expectancy for a white male, the life expectancy must be based on tables for
white males only, rather than tables for the general population); see also August
McCarthy, Note, The Lost Futures of Lead-Poisoned Children: Race-Based
Damage Awards and the Limits of Constitutionality, 14 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS.
L.J. 75, 101 (2004) (“If the races of two plaintiffs make it more likely . . . that
one plaintiff will earn less money in her lifetime than the other plaintiff, then
this evidence is relevant.”).
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because they have no work history, or because future prospects
are uncertain.55 In one stark example, a woman, her unborn
child, and her six year-old goddaughter were killed in a car
accident.56 Whether the woman would have been promoted at her
job,57 whether the six year-old would have gone to college,58 and
virtually everything about the unborn child was unknown.59 As
the court noted, “virtually all hypothesis and projections relating
to [a] decedents’ [or injured individuals’] lives are necessarily
speculative. No triers of fact, be they jurors or judges, can predict
the future. The wisest of sages acknowledges this.”60
To determine future lost earnings, courts sometimes depend
on expert witnesses.61 Many times, the expert witness relies on
Department of Labor statistics and work-life expectancy tables to
determine the likely earnings and probable number of years an
individual would work but for the injury.62 These statistics and
tables often identify factors such as race, ethnicity, and gender,
which experts may take into account.63 For example, numerous
55. See Murray v. Sanford, 487 S.E.2d 135, 136 (Ga. App. 1997) (“When a
permanent injury affects the injured party’s ability to work, only one
compensation exists; but that compensation may involve three elements: the
plaintiff’s diminished ability to labor, diminished earning capacity, and future
lost earnings.”).
56. See Childs v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 1570, 1572–74 (S.D. Ga. 1996)
(describing the facts that lead to litigation).
57. See id. at 1573–74 (examining Debra’s current job and the potential
future prospects she could face).
58. See id. at 1572–73 (noting that Ashleigh had some disadvantages but
had shown aptitude in school).
59. See id. at 1574 (explaining that the only known information about
General was his mother, his gender, and that he was a healthy fetus).
60. Id. at 1578.
61. See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(considering the testimony of three experts to determine future economic
prospects).
62. See, e.g., id. (noting that the defendant’s attorney attempted to argue
that the plaintiff was unlikely to obtain postsecondary education based on
statistics showing that Hispanics make less money and attend college less
often).
63. See generally, e.g., BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S
EARNINGS IN 2014 (Nov. 2015) [hereinafter HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS],
http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/cps/highlights-of-womens-earnings-in-2014.pdf
(examining wages for women and men and including race, ethnicity, education,
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jurisdictions have repeatedly upheld the use of Department of
Labor statistical tables to determine work-life expectancy and
estimated retirement age.64 Work-life expectancy concerns the
amount of time a given individual is likely to have remained in
the workforce.65 Courts have stated that statistical tables are
relevant and admissible as an accepted and authoritative basis
for determining work-life expectancy.66 The tort system therefore
seeks to supplement the information about the plaintiff to ensure
she is compensated for her loss through accurate data and
realistic expectations.67 The work-life expectancy tables, however,
and other factors as part of the analysis); Labor Force Statistics from the
Current
Population
Survey,
BUREAU
OF
LAB.
STAT.,
http://www.bls.gov/cps/tables.htm#charemp (last modified Mar. 24, 2016) (last
visited June 5, 2016) (setting out monthly data on employment, including
information about which race or ethnicity has employment) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., MEDIAN WEEKLY
EARNINGS OF FULL-TIME WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS BY DETAILED OCCUPATION
AND SEX (2015), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat39.pdf (setting out statistics of
earnings by men and women in various jobs).
64. See Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 1996)
(finding that an expert’s testimony regarding work-life expectancy was properly
admitted because it was based on “widely accepted work-life tables published by
the Department of Labor”); Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 735 F. Supp. 1167,
1175 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (“Statistical charts, such as the mortality tables and worklife expectancy tables prepared by the United States Department of Labor,
compile averages and are often deemed authoritative, particularly in the
absence of contradictory particularized evidence.”); Giza v. BNSF Ry. Co., 843
N.W.2d 713, 723 (Iowa 2014) (“When considering lost earning capacity claims in
other contexts, courts have found average retirement ages to be relevant and
admissible. . . . [T]o determine when someone is likely to retire, we would want
to look at when other people retire.”); Temple v. Murphy, 30 A.3d 992, 1003 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (concluding that in determining damages, a jury should
consider all circumstances including “general population statistics, i.e. life
expectancy and work life expectancy”).
65. See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 81 (“Worklife expectancy is distinct
from life expectancy. Worklife expectancy is derived from the working
experience of all persons in the plaintiff’s gender or racial group; it incorporates
rates of unemployment, both voluntary and involuntary, as well as expected
retirement age.”).
66. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Pitts, 61 A.3d 767, 791 (Md. 2013)
(“[S]tatistics discussing an individual’s projected date of retirement, or worklife
expectancy, have been widely held to be relevant when future wage loss is at
issue.”).
67. See Weil v. Seltzer, 873 F.2d 1453, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[I]n a sense
statistics are an attempt to take the speculation and conjecture out of the
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result in disparate numbers based on race, ethnicity, and
gender.68
Because experts use the statistics for damage calculation,
and courts admit the expert calculations based on the statistics,
similarly situated individuals of different races or genders may
face widely disparate damage awards.69 Work-life expectancy
tables from 2011 found that an eighteen-year-old female with a
high school diploma would have lifetime work experience 85% the
amount of lifetime work experience of an eighteen-year-old male
with a high school diploma.70 The argument for using these
statistics—despite disparate numbers that do not account for an
individual’s ability to overcome adversity—is that women
typically do work fewer traditional hours and earn less than
men.71 Further, the argument for using these statistics depends
on the fact that Hispanics and African-Americans statistically do
earn less than whites and Asians.72 In cases with no work history
on which to rely, experts depend on statistics to supplement any
damages equation.”).
68. See, e.g., Caron v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 378, 385 (D.R.I. 1975)
(awarding lower awards to a woman based on fewer years in the work force to
account for child-rearing years); Morrison v. Alaska, 516 P.2d 402, 404 (Alaska
1973) (concluding that an injured woman was likely to work for only five years
and then marry and therefore was entitled to only nominal damages); see also
Powell v. Parker, 303 S.E.2d 225, 228 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (using race-based
statistics along with individualized factors to determine lost earning capacity for
a wrongful death action of a seventeen-year-old male).
69. See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 83–84 (noting an anecdote Chamallas
heard from a colleague in which the projected lifetime income for a female
college graduate was almost $600,000 less than that of her male counterpart).
70. See Kurt V. Krueger & Frank Slesnick, Total Worklife Expectancy, 25 J.
FORENSIC ECON. 51, 52 (2014) (explaining that the “current standard in
determining worklife expectancy” shows an average worklife expectancy of 38.72
years for an eighteen-year-old male and 32.91 years for an eighteen-year-old
female).
71. See generally HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS, supra note 63, at 3–4
(noting that women earn less than men in all racial categories and age
categories, and that women tend to work fewer hours compared to their male
counterparts).
72. See id. at 4 (listing 2014 annual average weekly earnings based on race
and gender, where Asians earn the most followed by whites, African Americans,
and Hispanics/Latinos, and women of every race earn less than their male
counterparts).
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individualized information.73 Statistics can be particularly helpful
in child injury cases when the child was injured or killed before
he could establish aptitude or interests.74 Experts therefore use
such statistics to help determine the actual amount needed to
compensate the plaintiff—to the extent that money can
compensate for a lost family member or grievous injury.75
Second, tort law seeks to ensure that defendants are liable
and pay for only the damage they actually cause and for the lost
income the plaintiff could have actually received.76 There is a
well-known tort doctrine known as the “thin skull rule.”77 This
rule basically states that you must “take your victim as you find
him,” regardless of what the average situation calls for.78 The
inverse of the thin skull rule has neither a name nor a doctrine. It
seems apparent, however, that a defendant would not be liable
for damages that did not occur to an individual, regardless of

73. See Temple v. Murphy, 30 A.3d 992, 1003 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011)
(noting that general population statistics is one piece of evidence a jury could
consider to determine damages).
74. See, e.g., Childs v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 1570, 1580 (S.D. Ga.
1996) (noting the difficulty in determining earnings “in light of the fact that
absolutely nothing is even known about [the unborn child’s] basic personal
attributes, not to mention . . . academic capabilities, work ethic, ability to get
along and gain rapport with people, etc.”).
75. See McCarthy, supra note 54, at 93 (“The economist is trained to make
such conclusions [about the likely future of a human being], to make sense out
of the uncertainty of future earnings, and the discipline that trained her accepts
race as an important indicator of future earnings.”).
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 47, topic 3, cmt. (b) (AM. LAW
INST. 1979) (“It is not essential to recovery that the plaintiff should have been
employed at the time of the accident, but his opportunities for employment are
relevant in determining the amount that he probably could have earned.”).
77. See Poole v. Copland, Inc., 498 S.E.2d 602, 604 (N.C. 1998) (“This rule
provides that if the defendant’s misconduct amounts to a breach of duty to a
person of ordinary susceptibility, he is liable for all damages suffered by the
plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that these damages were unusually extensive
because of a peculiar susceptibility of the plaintiff.”).
78. See Fleckner v. Fleckner, 895 N.E.2d 896, 712, 715 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008)
(“[A] defendant who negligently inflicts injury on another takes the injured
party as he finds her, which means it is not a defense that some other person of
greater strength, constitution, or makeup might have been less injured, or
differently injured, or quicker to recover.” (alteration in original) (citation
omitted)).
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what would happen to an “average individual.”79 As stated above,
minority-based statistics attempt to refine and set a more
accurate number for damages.80
Both of these goals arguably support the use of minoritybased statistics.81 Both rely on the fundamental preference of
individualized determinations or, as one scholar describes, liberty
over equality.82 Adjudication judges and determines individual
outcomes rather than equivalent outcomes.83 The Supreme Court
has expressed a desire for liberty over equality in adjudication.84
While equality may be a valid goal, the Court has expressed the
opinion that individual adjudication is preferable, even where
nearly identical facts could lead to different outcomes and
duplicative litigation.85
Alexandra Lahav examined the struggle between liberty and
equality in the context of mass tort actions and argued that
79. This principle follows from a similar general principle that tort liability
must be limited and cannot be infinite. See Right v. Breen, 890 A.2d 1287, 1290
(Conn. 2006) (explaining that a plaintiff must show defendant caused actual
harm to recover damages).
80. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text (noting the uncertainty
inherent in determining lost future earnings for an injured child, and that
experts use minority-based statistics to supplement limited facts).
81. See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text (explaining the argument
that minority-based statistics represent actual people and encourage accurate
data, compensating the plaintiff for actual damage, and holding the defendant
responsible for the harm actually caused).
82. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L.
REV. 571, 572–73 (2012) (“Liberty in civil litigation is summed up as deep rooted
historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court. Equality is
embodied in the common law principle that like cases should be treated alike.”
(citations omitted)).
83. See id. at 572–73 (“[O]ur criminal justice system tolerates a great deal
of inconsistency in outcomes. Study after study has shown that both jurors and
legal professionals assess damages inconsistently in tort cases.”).
84. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011)
(finding that rights cannot be abridged, modified, or enlarged, and so a class
could not be certified because individualized determinations and defenses to
individual claims require individualized proceedings, regardless of how
presumptively valid claims were).
85. See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 902–04 (2008) (rejecting the
defendant’s theory that the public at large was represented in the suit despite
potential “limitless” or repetitive litigation because relief is meant to benefit
individuals).
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consistency of results is a beneficial goal.86 Lahav explains that
inconsistency of results in tort cases is hard to examine because
of the lack of empirical evidence and how the method of valuation
is neither agreed upon nor disclosed.87 The method of valuation is
difficult to fully ascertain in future lost earning calculations
because experts have discretion, so long as their methods meet
evidentiary requirements.88 Lahav also noted that attempting to
attain equality in damage calculations begs the question of what
makes different cases different, but did not examine how the use
of minority-based statistics affects liberty and equality.89 For lost
future earnings calculations in cases like Gary’s, where there is
little current evidence on which to base damages, it can be
difficult to ascertain what differences matter.90 If the goal of
equality is to treat like cases alike, courts should arguably use
differences such as race, gender, or socioeconomic categories. As
Lahav notes, “[t]he adjudicator ought to use only legally relevant
variables to determine which members of the plaintiff population
are alike.”91
Minority-based tables are arguably legally relevant.92 The
idea that liberty is preferred over equality thus offers an
86. See generally Lahav, supra note 82 (examining how the traditional
preference for individual adjudication is losing traction in lower courts in favor
of equal outcomes for mass court cases through trial by formula).
87. See id. at 589
First, there is no agreed-upon metric for measuring or monetizing
injury in cases. Second, the tort system is a complex, private, and
largely hidden system of compensation. . . . The third problem . . . is a
result of the interaction of the first two problems. . . . Monetizing
injuries based on past outcome also produces a static value.
88. See Phillips v. Indus. Mach., 597 N.W.2d 377, 392–93 (Neb. 1999)
(explaining that an expert can use external data so long as it is accepted and
“meets minimum standards of reliability”).
89. See Lahav, supra note 82, at 594–95 (“Some formal philosophers argue
that formal equality—the principle that like cases be treated alike—is really an
empty concept because it begs the key question of which cases are alike.”).
90. See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(discussing expert methodology and reliance on family history and neighborhood
and ethnicity).
91. Lahav, supra note 82, at 595.
92. See Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 1996)
(allowing expert testimony based on Department of Labor work-life tables as
based on a “properly laid foundation”).
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argument for the use of minority-based statistics by encouraging
damage determinations based on a plaintiff’s personal
characteristics.93 Minority-based statistics can potentially help an
expert determine more accurate figures for damages.94 As one
author points out, “[i]f non-white workers tend to earn less than
white workers, then this problem extends far beyond the scope of
a trial court.”95 Although utilizing statistics based on race,
ethnicity, and gender can cause unfairly disparate amounts,
experts are meant to assist factfinders in deciding uncertain
damages.96 Because damage awards are meant to compensate the
plaintiff in a close approximation of actual damages on an
individual basis, experts must be able to utilize relevant available
data.97
In recent years, the use of minority-based statistics has come
under attack as both unreliable and, in one case,
unconstitutional.98 Despite the recent attacks, experts and courts
continue to use them to determine lost future earnings.99 The
vocational tables experts use to determine worklife expectancy for
disabled persons “produce worklife expectancy values for men
and women at various levels of education from the ages of sixteen
93. See McCarthy, supra note 54, at 94–95 (“The very uncertainty of future
earning the critics of race-based damage awards decry actually weighs in favor
of admitting expert testimony concerning every available indicator, including
race.”).
94. See id. at 95 (“We are after the truth, yes, but it is a judicial truth,
tempered by the hard realities of the world in which we live.”).
95. Id.
96. See Ewing v. Esterholt, 684 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Mont. 1984) (“To reduce
the inherent uncertainty of future damages, this Court has allowed testimony
from various economic experts and the use of mortality and actuarial tables to
aid jury determinations.” (citing Krohmer v. Dahl, 402 P.2d 979, 981 (Mont.
1965))).
97. See McCarthy, supra note 54, at 94 (arguing that the independence of
the jury is served through allowing experts to offer evidence with any and all
relevant data).
98. See infra Part III (discussing the constitutional argument set forth by
the Eastern District of New York).
99. See McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“Despite the 2000 census’ more detailed self-categorization system,
demographic studies that use pre-2000 census data continue to define ‘race’ by
using the 1977 [Office of Management and Budget] directive.”).
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through seventy-five.”100 As long as the Department of Labor and
Census Bureau statistics rely on race and ethnicity as factors,
experts who rely on them will be using minority-based
statistics.101 Thus, experts continue to rely on explicitly genderand race-based tables.102
III. Emerging Case Law Against Minority-Based Statistical
Tables
In recent years, many courts have found minority-based
statistics unreliable but declined to consider the constitutionality
question.103 Some courts have found that worklife and lifetime
earning determinations based on minority-based tables fails to
meet standards of evidence.104 The argument is that statistical
tables do not provide “sufficient facts or data” upon which to
determine damages.105 Other courts have found that
100. ANDREW SUM, ISHWAR KHATIWADA & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CTR. FOR
LABOR MKT. STUDIES, REPLICATING THE GAMBOA GIBSON WORKLIFE TABLES 2
(2010). But see James W. Bryan & E. Taylor Stukes, Debunking Lost Future
Earnings Damages, THE TRANSP. LAWYER, Feb. 2011, at 25 (noting that Gamboa
tables have been found unreliable and urging lawyers to be on the lookout for an
expert’s use of such tables).
101. See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BULBICK, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 479 (2d ed. 2015) (explaining that projections often use minority-based
statistics, and despite concerns the use of the tables can ensure accuracy).
102. See Sara A. Ford, Trial Talk: The Myth of Flawed “Methodology”,
GREATER LOUISVILLE METRO ATT’Y AT L. MAG., July/Aug. 2011, at 14 (“The role of
an expert in the courtroom is to aid the trier of fact in decision-making.
Demographic data that describes a particular population are helpful in the
decision-making process.”).
103. See, e.g., Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 167 (1st Cir. 1988)
(finding that using sex-based work-life tables is suspect and there is no
requirement to use them); see also supra note 29 (listing cases that have refused
to use minority-based statistics because of concerns about fairness and
unreliability).
104. See, e.g., Rebelwood Apartments RP, LP v. English, 48 So. 3d 483, 494
(Miss. 2010) (arguing that using national-average and statistical data for
earnings calculations fails the Daubert standard by not being based on sufficient
facts or data).
105. See id. at 496 (concluding that testimony of an expert relying on
statistical tables “fails the requirement that it be based on sufficient facts or
data”); see also FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert . . .
may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: . . . the testimony is based
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minority-based statistics are unreliable because they fail to
account for individual potential.106 One scholar has argued for
adoption of “resiliency theory,” which embraces the idea that
“children living under extreme conditions (such as poverty) can
rise far beyond what is expected of them.”107 Finally, some
scholars have noted that minority-based statistics are both
unreliable and inadvisable because using such statistics
reinforces current discrimination and disparity.108
A. Judge Weinstein and the Eastern District of New York’s
Constitutional Argument
In the past few years, these findings have culminated in the
work of the well-respected Judge Weinstein109 in the U.S. District
for the Eastern District of New York.110 Judge Weinstein took
claims of unreliability one step further and concluded that the
use of minority-based statistics violates the Constitution.111 This
on sufficient facts or data.”).
106. See, e.g., Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Sutton, 765 So. 2d 1269, 1276–77
(Miss. 2000) (“Who is to say that a child from the most impoverished part of the
state or with extremely poor parents has less of a future earnings potential than
a child from the wealthiest part of the state with wealthy parents?”).
107. Greenberg, supra note 30, at 456.
108. See Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Replicating and Perpetuating Inequalities
in Personal Injury Claims Through Female-Specific Contingencies, 49 MCGILL
L.J. 309, 314 (2004) (explaining that the use of gender-based statistics
“perpetuates historical inequities” by reinforcing past and current
discrimination); see also WRIGGENS & CHAMALLAS, supra note 31, at 159 (noting
that past discrimination can result in lower damage determinations, for
example, “[i]f black men have been incarcerated at a much higher rate than
white men, resulting in lower labor-force participation rates for black men, racebased worklife estimates predict that they will continue to work fewer years
than whites”).
109. See Deirdre M. Smith, The Disordered and Discredited Plaintiff:
Psychiatric Evidence in Civil Litigation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 749, 821 (2010)
(noting that Judge Weinstein is “unquestionably the most respected
contemporary jurist on the law of evidence”).
110. See infra notes 115–126 and accompanying text (discussing McMillan v.
City of New York 253 F.R.D. 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)), and infra notes 133–142 and
accompanying text (discussing G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126
(E.D.N.Y. 2015)).
111. See Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d at 129 (“[T]he specific characteristics of
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conclusion has led to some excitement over the potential
ramifications.112 The Eastern District of New York first found
that the use of race-based life expectancy tables is
unconstitutional.113 Later, the court extended this finding to
gender- and ethnicity-based statistics of lifetime earnings.114
1. McMillan v. City of New York
In 2008, McMillan v. City of New York115 concluded that it is
impermissible to utilize race-based statistics because race is an
illusory statistic for life expectancy determinations.116 McMillan
concerned a male African-American plaintiff who was injured in a
ferryboat crash.117 To calculate the plaintiff’s damages, the court
had to determine his expected life expectancy.118 The court found
that life expectancy rates based on race were unreliable and

the child and his family, rather than the characterization of the child as a
member of a particular ethnic group must be used in determining damages. The
ruling [is] based on the same constitutional and other factors relied upon in
[McMillan, 253 F.R.D. 247].”).
112. Christopher D. Barraza, Recent Decision Rejects Ethnicity as a Factor
for Determining Future Lost Earning, LEXOLOGY: PROD. LIAB. MONITOR (Aug. 12,
2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b5be833c-5de4-4196-ad4ce191043d0ee9 (last visited June 5, 2016) (“[G]iven the prominence of Judge
Weinstein . . . it is conceivable that other courts may follow Kimpson in
instances where ethnicity is used to challenge calculations of future lost
earnings in tort cases.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
113. See McMillan, 253 F.R.D. at 255–56 (finding experts’ use of race-based
life expectancy table is state action that violates the plaintiff’s equal protection
and due process rights)
114. See Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d at 129 (finding experts’ use of
ethnicity-based statistics to determine future earnings is state action that
violates the plaintiff’s equal protection and due process rights).
115. 253 F.R.D. 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
116. See id. at 250 (explaining that race is a socially constructed
designation, and the main predictor of life expectancy is socioeconomic status).
117. See id. at 248 (“James McMillan, the claimant, was rendered a
quadriplegic in the crash of a ferryboat operated negligently by the City of New
York.”).
118. See id. at 248–49 (noting that the “critical factor” of life expectancy
needed to be put before the jury, and there was a dispute on whether experts
could use life expectancy tables based on race).
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raised constitutional issues.119 McMillan based this finding in
large part on the argument that race is an illusory statistic—
meaning that race is socially constructed and not a biological
characteristic.120 The argument noted that “the reality [is] that
the diversity of human biology has little in common with socially
constructed ‘racial’ categories.”121 Further, life expectancy rates
typically attributable to race are actually based on socioeconomic
status.122 Thus, Judge Weinstein concluded that race-based
statistics are inherently unreliable.123
The court also argued that the use of race-based statistics
was discriminatory and constitutionally questionable.124 It noted
that “[b]y allowing use of ‘race’-based statistics, a court would be
creating arbitrary and irrational state action.”125 McMillan found
that “[j]udicial reliance on ‘racial’ classifications constitutes state
action.”126 The court argued that the admission of expert
testimony that relies on race-based life expectancy tables
constitutes state action by the judge who failed to give equal
protection to the plaintiff.127 In doing so, Judge Weinstein relied
heavily on the burdens that these “arbitrary” statistics place on

119. See id. at 248 (finding that “the unreliability of ‘race’ as a predictor of
life expectancy as well as normative constitutional requirements of equal
treatment and due process support” using race neutral life expectancy tables).
120. See id. at 249–50 (“DNA technology finds little variation among ‘races’
(humans are genetically 99.9% identical), and it is difficult to pinpoint any
‘racial identity’ of an individual through his or her genes.”).
121. Id. at 250.
122. See id. at 252 (noting that, in controlled studies that account only for
socioeconomic status, life expectancy rates for African-Americans are similar or
identical to Caucasians).
123. See id. at 251 (“[T]he tables frequently employed by courts in
determining tort damages fail to account for the nuanced reality of ‘racial’
heritage in the United States today.”).
124. See id. at 255–56 (arguing that using race-based statistics classifies
individuals according to “suspect categories,” and that a court is, in essence,
endorsing their use constituting arbitrary state action).
125. Id. at 256.
126. Id. at 255.
127. See id. (“Equal Protection in this context demands that the claimant
not be subjected to a disadvantageous life expectancy estimate solely on the
basis of a ‘racial’ classification.”).
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minorities.128 These burdens, the argument goes, are the result of
arbitrary discriminatory state action based on a racial
classification and their admission fails strict scrutiny.129
Further, the court also argued that compensation in a tort
case is “in effect a property right” that requires due process.130
When the government takes property, an individual is entitled to
due process of the law.131 Because a court’s admission of evidence
based on minority-based tables is arbitrary state action, Judge
Weinstein argued it is a due process violation.132 McMillan laid
the groundwork for the finding of a constitutional violation
whenever a judge admits expert testimony relying on any
minority-based statistics in its later case G.M.M. v. Kimpson.133
2. G.M.M. v. Kimpson
G.M.M. v. Kimpson involved a lead poisoned child—referred
to in the introduction as Gary.134 Gary’s mother brought suit and

128. See id. at 256 (“The legal system does not work fairly and with due
process if one class of litigants is unduly burdened in litigation through the
application of inappropriate ‘race’-based statistics.”).
129. See id. at 255 (explaining that, where state action is based upon racial
classifications, the suspect nature of the racial class triggers strict scrutiny,
which is not met in this case).
130. Id.; see also infra Part IV.C.1 (exploring the argument that an
individual has a property interest in tort compensation)
131. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“Procedural due
process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive
individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”).
132. See McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“Were the court to apply an ill-founded assumption, automatically burdening
on ‘racial’ grounds a class of litigants who seek compensation, there would be a
denial of due process.”).
133. See 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that relying on
illusory minority-based statistics results in “arbitrary and irrational state
action” which constitutes a “denial of due process”); see also Chamallas, supra
note 31, at 77 (“A finding of sufficient state action is required . . . before any
constitutional challenge can be made to the use of race-based or gender-based
data in tort litigation.”).
134. See Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d, at 131 (describing plaintiff’s claims); see
also supra notes 1–14 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Kimpson).
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won a claim for damages in a jury trial.135 In his opinion
discussing the admissibility of the expert testimony, Judge
Weinstein built on McMillan and concluded that the use of all
minority-based statistics is unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment.136
At the time of trial, the court identified Gary as a Hispanic
male.137 The defendant’s expert, Dr. Lentz, relied on
ethnicity-based statistics to claim future economic loss of
earnings that were lower than the plaintiffs’ expert’s
estimation.138 Dr. Lentz argued that, because Hispanics are
statistically less likely to earn postsecondary degrees, it was
improbable that Gary would do so.139 The plaintiffs pointed out
that Gary’s mother held a Master of Fine Arts, and Gary’s father
had a baccalaureate degree, and so he would have been likely to
obtain a postsecondary degree.140 The court rejected the
defendant expert’s testimony, concluding that it is
unconstitutional to consider ethnicity-based statistics rather than
the individual characteristics of the plaintiff.141 In reaching this
conclusion, the court rejected “a principle in awarding damages
‘that reflect subtle but pervasive racism and classism.’”142
135. See id. at 130–31 (“After a two-week trial with extensive expert
testimony, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on three
theories . . . .”).
136. See id. at 152 (finding that judicial reliance on minority-based statistics
results in discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and constitutes
“arbitrary and irrational state action” in violation of the Due Process Clause).
137. Id. at 128–29.
138. See id. at 135 (noting that the defendant’s expert Dr. Lentz is a forensic
economist who based his calculations on G.M.M.’s status as Hispanic).
139. See id. at 129 (“[D]efendant’s attorney attempted to show, through the
use of expert economic testimony, statistics and cross-examination of the
plaintiffs’ experts, that because the child was ‘Hispanic,’ his likelihood of
obtaining a Bachelor, Master, or Doctoral degree, and any corresponding
elevated income, was improbable.”).
140. See id. at 129 (finding that given G.M.M.’s “specific family background,”
there was a very high probability he would have earned a secondary degree
regardless of statistics based on ethnicity).
141. See id. at 132–33 (quoting the court’s instruction to the defendant’s
expert witness that the expert cannot use general ethnicity-based statistics to
calculate lost future earnings).
142. Id. at 154 (quoting Greenberg, supra note 30, at 457).
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Kimpson expanded McMillan by concluding that
ethnicity-based statistics, as well as race-based statistics, violate
the Constitution.143 Even under Kimpson’s broad constitutional
argument, questions remain on whether gender- or other
minority-based statistics besides race or ethnicity also would be
found unconstitutional.144 Judge Weinstein nonetheless expressed
strongly that “[t]he state itself discriminates by enforcing a
substantive rule of discrimination—damages—based on race or
ethnicity in reducing damages in tort cases. Such an illegal
standard cannot be enforced by the courts.”145
IV. The Constitutional Argument
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the state in which they reside. No state
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 146

This section contains guarantees of procedural due process,147
substantive due process,148 and equal protection.149 Together
143. See id. at 148–49 (“It is unconstitutional in a tort trial to premise
projected societal and educational achievements on race or ethnicity to reduce
tort damages.”).
144. See, e.g., Adjin-Tettey, supra note 108, at 311 (arguing that using
gender-based statistics in awards for tort damages reinforces the
marginalization of women by returning female plaintiffs to the “status quo
ante”).
145. G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
146. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
147. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“Procedural due
process imposes certain constraints on governmental decisions which deprive
individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”).
148. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (“The Due
Process clause guarantees more than fair process, and the ‘liberty’ it protects
includes more than the absence of physical restraint.”).
149. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (explaining that the Equal
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these sections protect individual rights.150 The Fourteenth
Amendment, however, “erects no shield against merely private
conduct,”151 but only against state action.152
A. State Action and the Use of Minority-Based Statistics
The Supreme Court has found that before any action may be
brought or rights may be protected, the Fourteenth
Amendment—like other constitutional amendments—has the
“threshold requirement” of state action.153 As one scholar noted:
“The text of the original Constitution unambiguously establishes
that it is a law governing government, not individuals.”154 Such a
restriction serves various purposes. One argument is that the
state action doctrine not only protects a zone of private autonomy,
but also protects state sovereignty.155 Another argument is that
the state action doctrine does not protect individuals’ zones of
interest, but is necessary for a democracy as a limitation on the
Fourteenth Amendment.156 The Supreme Court has sometimes
Protection clause requires equal treatment under the law and no “arbitrary and
invidious discrimination”).
150. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (“[T]he
guarantees of due process, though having their roots in Magna Carta’s ‘per
legem terrae’ and considered as procedural safeguards ‘against executive
usurpation and tyranny,’ have in this country ‘become bulwarks also against
arbitrary legislation.’” (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting))).
151. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
152. See id. (“[T]he action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States.”).
153. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (“Foremost
among these limitations is the time-honored principle that the Fourteenth
Amendment, by its terms, prohibits only state action.”).
154. Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of
Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1387 (2006).
155. See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (“Careful
adherence to the ‘state action’ requirement preserves an area of individual
freedom by limiting the reach of individual freedom by limiting the reach of
federal law and federal judicial power. It also avoids imposing on the State . . .
responsibility for which they cannot fairly be blamed.”).
156. See Huhn, supra note 153, at 1381–82 (arguing that the Supreme Court
has misconstrued the doctrine because individuals have no constitutional right
to violate others’ fundamental rights).
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expanded the definition of what constitutes a state act or actor—
there is a public function exception157 and an entanglement
exception.158 Despite debates over the purpose of the state action
doctrine and its exceptions, the doctrine continues to be invoked
and has been reaffirmed in recent years.159 Experts’ and courts’
use of minority-based statistics must, therefore, constitute state
action to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.160
Kimpson found that using ethnicity-based tables violated the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses under the Fourteenth
Amendment.161 The court argued that the use of minority-based
statistics constitutes “arbitrary and irrational state action” but
did not provide a solid basis for that finding.162 The court stated
that “[t]he state itself discriminates by enforcing a substantive
rule of discrimination—damages—based on race or ethnicity in
reducing damages in tort cases.”163 This claim was supported only
by an article by Martha Chamallas,164 which reasoned that a
157. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87–88 (1980)
(concluding that a shopping center could not prevent individuals from passing
out pamphlets and seeking signatures because the public nature of the shopping
center prevents it from being considered private in the sense that most private
businesses are).
158. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937 (noting that claims are not barred where
private and government actors and acts are entangled, which can be shown if:
(1) the deprivation is caused by a “right or privilege created by the state;” and
(2) the individual causing the deprivation can be said to be a state actor).
159. See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 721, 730 (2012)
(upholding state action requirement in pretrial screening of eyewitness
statements, and holding that the due process clause does not require such
screening where there is no police—and no state—action); see also Christopher
W. Schmidt, The Sit-Ins and the State Action Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 767, 770 (2010) (explaining that even during the civil rights era, neither the
Supreme Court nor Congress redefined the Fourteenth Amendment by
removing the state action doctrine).
160. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992) (“Where
resegregation is a product not of state action but of private choices, it does not
have constitutional implications.”).
161. See supra notes 140–145 and accompanying text (discussing Kimpson).
162. G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
163. Id. at 149.
164. Unsupported opinions do not necessarily translate to incorrect opinions.
Ours is a system of common law, however, and as such courts should be hesitant
to adopt rules with little or no support.
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court admitting expert testimony based on minority-based tables
constitutes state action by endorsing the use of minority-based
statistics.165 Chamallas relied on Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Company166 to contend that use of race-based classifications in
civil litigation constitutes state action.167 Chamallas argued that
the use of expert testimony rises to the level of state action by
providing a means for the jury to determine the outcome.168
In Edmonson, the plaintiff was injured while working
construction when the defendant’s truck rolled into him.169 After
bringing suit, “Edmonson invoked his Sixth Amendment right to
a trial by jury.”170 Edmonson (the plaintiff) was a black man, and
during voir dire the defendant company used peremptory strikes
to remove the two black veniremen.171 Edmonson sought to
challenge the peremptory strikes on the ground that they were
based on race, but the district court denied his request.172 A
divided panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, but
then subsequently affirmed en banc.173
On appeal from the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court held
that “the exercise of peremptory challenges by the defendant in
165. See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 105 (“My principal argument for
finding state action is that it is impossible to separate the use of the statistics
from the underlying legal standard in the case.”).
166. See 500 U.S. 614, 628–29 (1991) (finding that private litigants’ use of
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of race violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
167. See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 106–11 (arguing that using of racebased statistics in tort actions is factually similar to using peremptory
challenges in civil cases).
168. See id. at 109 (“[T]he objective of expert testimony is to help the jury
apply the law to the facts, a process that is intricately connected to choice of the
governing legal standard.”).
169. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616 (describing plaintiff’s injuries).
170. Id.
171. See id. at 616–17 (noting that Leesville used “two of its three
peremptory challenges to remove black persons from the prospective jury”).
172. See id. at 617 (explaining that Edmonson requested a race-neutral
explanation according to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), but district
court denied the request, stating that Batson does not apply to civil
proceedings).
173. See id. (“A divided en banc panel affirmed . . . holding that a private
litigant in a civil case can exercise peremptory challenges without accountability
for alleged racial classifications.”).
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the District Court was pursuant to a course of state action.” 174
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted that the state
action doctrine consists of two questions: “first whether the
claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a
right or privilege having its source in state authority . . . and
second whether the private party charged with the deprivation
could be described in all fairness as a state actor.”175
1. Experts’ Use of Minority-Based Statistics Is Not Sourced from
State Authority Because Experts Are Independent and Jurors Are
Not Required to Accept the Testimony.
Kennedy wrote that the first question was obvious—
peremptory strikes exist only in a court of law and arise only
under statutory and court authority.176 Chamallas noted that this
question is not so clearly answered when experts use
minority-based statistics given the numerous uses of economic
projections outside the courtroom, for example, negotiations or
other financial transactions.177 She argued, however, that experts’
testimony “refin[es] the legal standard for damages” and thus
“has its source in state authority.”178 While this argument has
some merit, it ignores the true nature of the Edmonson inquiry.
As Edmonson notes, “[w]ithout its authorization, granted by an
Act of Congress itself, [the defendant] would not have been able
to engage in the alleged discriminatory acts.”179 The court
emphasized the express authorization required by the
government inherent in peremptory strikes, as well as the

174. Id. at 622.
175. Id. at 620 (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939–42
(1982)).
176. See id. at 620–21 (finding that peremptory challenges do not arise
because of the Constitution, but because of common law tradition and statutory
authority, and that the defendants would not be able to exercise peremptory
challenges if not for a statute).
177. See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 107 (explaining that the first
Edmonson inquiry is more difficult when considering an expert’s testimony).
178. Id.
179. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991).
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historical nature of governmental endorsement.180 Expert
opinions have neither exclusive nor historic government
endorsement.181
Chamallas also argued that admission of expert testimony “is
accomplished through state authorization of courtroom
procedures and direct involvement of the trial judge. Once so
treated, the testimony should no longer be regarded as private,
simply because the state did not dictate the content of the
testimony nor pay the witness the expenses . . .”182 Through
sanctioning the testimony and admitting the witness as an
expert, so the argument goes, the court is turning the private
witness into a state actor.183
Expert testimony, however, does not have to be considered by
the state because the jury can disregard what an expert offers.184
While the objective of expert testimony is to assist the jury, it is
quite different to say this testimony constitutes state action.
Further, outlandish consequences can result if state action arises
because the judge allowed an expert to use minority-based
statistics, for example, “to declare the practice of admitting
expert testimony unconstitutional solely on the basis that the
judge does not approve of the content of the testimony would in
180. See id. at 620–21 (explaining that peremptory challenges only exist
when the government allows them, and there is a long history of “legislative
authorizations, as well as limitations . . . [that] date back as far as the founding
of the Republic”).
181. For example, Chamallas conceded that experts are often used for
purposes completely separate from the courtroom. See Chamallas, supra note
31, at 107 (noting that experts are used for settlement and financial
transactions); see also Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations
Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40–41 (1901) (explaining that
courts historically used experts in a variety of ways: by selecting jurors
“especially fitted” to the issues; by calling individuals with “skilled knowledge”
and adopting the findings; and finally more recently calling individuals directly
before the jury).
182. Chamallas, supra note 31, at 107–08.
183. See id. (arguing that the “special status” the court gives the expert
“carries unusual weight” that private actors do not possess).
184. See Temple v. Murphy, 30 A.3d 992, 1003 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 2011)
(“The jury could consider the totality of the evidence, including Mr. Murphy’s
age, health, employment, financial situation, and general population statistics,
i.e., life expectancy and work life expectancy, to determine amount of lost
support.”).
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effect overrule Daubert and the substantial line of cases that have
developed the Court’s expert testimony doctrine.”185 The idea that
an expert is a state actor simply because a judge allows the
testimony is hard to fathom.186 The expert’s authority also is not
derived from the judge’s endorsement but from her knowledge of
the relevant field and her ability to meet evidentiary
requirements.187 Although a court must qualify an expert, “a
witness does not qualify as an expert if [her] background is so
limited that there is no reasonable expectation the witness can
assist the trier of fact.”188 Because the knowledge required to be
an expert is not derived from the court, the expert does not have
“its source in state authority.”189
2. Experts Are Not State Actors
Under the second question—whether the private actor can
fairly be considered a state actor—the Edmonson Court noted
three factors: (1) how much the actor “relies on governmental
assistance”; (2) is the actor “performing a traditional
governmental function; and (3) is the injury uniquely aggravated
by the “governmental authority.”190
a. Governmental Assistance Is Not Necessary for Experts
In examining the amount of governmental assistance, the
Court explained that the system of juror selection—which
185. McCarthy, supra note 54, at 101.
186. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972) (“[Holding]
that discrimination by an otherwise private entity would be violative of the
Equal Protection Clause if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or
service from the State . . . would utterly emasculate the distinction between
private as distinguished from state conduct.”).
187. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, an expert witness
must be qualified “by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” FED.
R. EVID. 702.
188. 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, FED. PRAC. & PROCEDURE: EVID. § 6265 (1997).
189. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991).
190. See id. at 621–22 (noting that the second Lugar prong is a fact-bound
inquiry that contains “certain principles of general application”).
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includes peremptory strikes—depends extensively upon the state
and “could not exist” without the governments’ participation.191
As the Court noted:
[E]ach district court in the federal system must adopt a plan
for locating and summoning to the court eligible prospective
jurors. . . . This plan, as with all other trial court procedures,
must implement statutory policies of random juror selection from
a fair cross section of the community, . . . and non-exclusion on
account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic
status. . . . Statutes prescribe many of the details of the jury
plan . . . .192
The Court also explained that a court tightly controls the
entire voir dire process.193 Edmonson emphasized that a court
participates directly in “enforcing a discriminatory peremptory
challenge” by rejecting the opposing counsel’s challenge.194
Chamallas argues that this finding could apply with equal force
to the admission of minority-based expert testimony.195 She
claims that when the court admits minority-based expert
testimony, “it tells the jury that race or sex is a legally
permissible criterion.”196
Chamallas’s argument ignores the fact-intensive nature of
the state action determination and the heavy emphasis the
Edmonson Court placed on the procedural control a court has
over the entire jury selection process.197 In Edmonson, the Court
spent four long paragraphs discussing the extent to which the
191. See id. (explaining that the peremptory challenges and juror selection
in a civil trial would not be possible without assistance from the court).
192. Id. at 622–23.
193. See id. at 623 (“The trial judge exercises substantial control over voir
dire in the federal system. . . . In some cases, judges may even conduct the
entire voir dire by themselves.”).
194. See id. at 624 (explaining that participation by the judge in peremptory
challenges is “direct and indispensable” and thus “involve[s] itself with invidious
discrimination” when it allows a discriminatory peremptory strike to occur).
195. See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 108 (premising the argument on the
fact the “state creates the evidentiary rules” and so becomes a “party to the act”
of using minority-based statistics).
196. Id.
197. See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text (examining the state’s
indispensability to juror selection as discussed in Edmonson).
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entire juror selection process depends on the court system.198 The
procedural power the court has over the jury is immense and
courts have both a right and a duty to manage jury procedure.199
Given this codependent relationship between the jury and the
court, it is not surprising that the court would find private actors
participating in jury selection constitutes state action.200 An
expert’s testimony is extremely different from peremptory strikes
in this way. Peremptory strikes are meant to “assist the
government in the selection of an impartial trier of fact.”201
Peremptory strikes are essential to a procedure over which the
state has absolute control, and thus, the private actor exercising
the peremptory strikes is subject to control as well.202
Expert testimony, on the other hand, merely sets forth one
piece of evidence from which the jury—the “quintessential
governmental body”203—may consider.204 Chamallas argues that,
when a judge admits expert testimony based on minority-based
statistics, they are clearly a participant in the discriminatory
action.205 She contends that the judge is “placing its power,
198. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622–24 (1991)
(laying out the various procedures over which the court controls the jury
selection process).
199. See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text (noting that a court
controls the way jurors are selected, how questions are asked, and selects
sanctions for individuals shirking jury duty).
200. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620 (“Although the conduct of private
parties lies beyond the Constitution’s scope in most instances, governmental
authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that its participants must
be deemed to act within the authority of the government and, as a result, be
subject to constitutional constraints.”).
201. Id. at 620.
202. See id. at 624 (“As we have outlined here, a private party could not
exercise its peremptory challenges absent the overt, significant assistance of the
court.”).
203. Id.
204. Experts are meant only to assist the factfinder in adjudication. See FED.
R. EVID. 702 notes of advisory committee on proposed rules (“The rule
accordingly recognizes that an expert on the stand may give a dissertation or
exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier
of fact to apply them to the facts.”).
205. See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 108–09 (arguing that a judge who
overrules an objection to evidence based on minority-based statistics
participates in discriminatory action).
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property and prestige behind the alleged discrimination”206 more
overtly than a judge who allows discriminatory peremptory
strikes.207
Chamallas’s argument, however, misinterprets Edmonson’s
mention
of
the
judge’s
participation
in
“invidious
208
discrimination.”
Edmonson focused on the judge’s action
because the judge’s act was indispensable to the private actor’s
use of the peremptory strike itself.209 In such a case, the private
actor—the defendant’s attorney—had to extensively rely on the
government to use discriminatory peremptory strikes.210 Expert
testimony does not rely on governmental assistance to the same
extent that private parties exercising peremptory challenges do.
The majority of the information that experts offer come from
external sources,211 and juries do not rely solely on the court to
judge an expert witness.212 Further, the court does not control the
extent of the expert’s testimony, and so the expert’s action is not
saddled with the absolute control that jury determination is.213
206. Id. at 108 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,
624 (1991)).
207. See id. (“[B]ecause the jury may well witness the exchange between the
objecting counsel and the court when admission of expert testimony is
challenged, this could be argued to present a stronger case than Edmonson for a
finding of state action.”)
208. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624.
209. See id. (explaining how the private actor “invokes the formal authority
of the court” and would be unable to act at all without the “overt, significant
assistance of the court”).
210. See id. at 623 (emphasizing the requirement that a private party rely
significantly on assistance from the court).
211. See supra notes 187–189 and accompanying text (explaining that an
expert must bring external knowledge or experience independent of a court’s
endorsement).
212. See Caroline T. Parrott et al., Differences in Expert Witness Knowledge:
Do Mock Jurors Notice and Does It Matter?, 43 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 69,
69 (2015) (“Contrary to the hypotheses that high knowledge would yield
increased credibility and agreement, knowledge manipulations influenced only
perceived expert likeability. The low-knowledge expert was perceived as more
likeable than the high-knowledge counterpart, a paradoxical finding.”).
213. While the court does serve as a “gatekeeper” of expert testimony, it does
not dictate the content outside traditional admissibility determinations. See
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules (“When
opinions are excluded, it is because they are unhelpful and therefore
superfluous and a waste of time.”).
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Experts also conduct minority-based determinations outside of
the court setting in purely private matters.214 This completely
private nature distinguishes from Edmonson, where “peremptory
challenges have no utility outside the jury system, a system
which the government alone administers.”215
b. In Testifying, Experts Are Not Performing a Function
Traditionally in the Hands of the Government
These factors also come into play regarding the Edmonson
Court’s second consideration—whether the actor is performing a
function traditionally in the hands of the government.216
Chamallas maintains that expert testimony meets this
consideration because “the court’s acceptance of an expert’s use of
race-based or gender-based data is inseparable from its
determination of substantive law and as such is appropriately
viewed as a traditional governmental function.”217 Chamallas
reframed the question by stating “the focus should be on whether
judicial admission of discriminatory expert testimony constitutes
state action.”218
Chamallas appears, however, to be applying the doctrine to
the wrong party. The question in Edmonson was whether, in
issuing discriminatory strikes, the private litigant partook in
discriminatory state action.219 Edmonson focused on the fact that
214. See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 107 (admitting that experts utilize
“economic projections of future earning capacity” outside the courtroom “in
settlement negotiations and in a wide variety of financial transactions”).
215. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624–26 (1991).
216. See id. at 624 (explaining that because the “jury exercises the power of
the court,” acts as “principal factfinder,” weighs evidence, and reaches a verdict,
the jury is performing a traditional government function, and choosing the jury
is as well); see also Marsh v. Alabama, 323 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (“[T]he owners
of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads. . . . are built and
operated primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a
public function.”).
217. Chamallas, supra note 31, at 109.
218. Id.
219. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619 (“Racial discrimination, though
invidious in all contexts, violates the Constitution only when it may be
attributed to state action. . . . Thus, the legality of the exclusion at issue here
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the private actor was helping to select “a quintessential
government body,”220 explaining that where “a government
confers on a private body the power to choose the government’s
employees or officials, the private body will be bound by the
constitutional mandate of race neutrality.”221 The Court focused
on the delegation of a traditionally government act—the
“appointment” of a governmental body.222 Thus, the private actor
himself was performing a traditional government function.223
Chamallas attempts to avoid this problem by explaining that the
admission of expert testimony is “intricately connected to choice
of the governing legal standard.”224 But providing evidence for a
legal standard is not the same as appointing a government actor
in a non-public election. Her analysis also impermissibly moves
away from the action of the private actor—the expert—to that of
the governmental actor—the judge.
c. The Adversarial Nature of Adjudication Ensures Mitigation of
Potential Injury
The final factor is whether the injury is uniquely aggravated
by government authority.225 Chamallas makes the valid point,
based on Edmonson, that discrimination in a courtroom is
particularly harmful.226 When a court admits minority-based
expert evaluations, it can compound the injury that invidious
turns on the extent to which a litigant in a civil case may be subject to the
Constitution’s restrictions.”).
220. Id. at 624.
221. Id. at 625.
222. See id. at 626 (expanding on precedent to find that, except for public
elections, appointment of a governmental body constitutes state action, even if
delegated to private individuals).
223. See id (“Though the motive of a peremptory challenge may be to protect
a private interest, the objective of jury selection proceedings is to determine
representation of a on a government body.”).
224. Chamallas, supra note 31, at 109.
225. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991)
(noting the severe nature of racial discrimination in the courtroom setting).
226. See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 110 (“Few places are a more real
expression of the constitutional authority of the government then a courtroom,
where the law itself unfolds.”).
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discrimination causes.227 Yet, as Chamallas herself admits, the
private status of the expert protects against such an injury.228
Juries know that experts are paid witnesses and “can be
instructed that the substance of the expert’s testimony does not
represent the views of the court.”229 Further, the opposing side is
free to counter the expert’s findings and offer expert testimony of
its own.230 Chamallas admits that Edmonson is easy to
implement while monitoring experts could be difficult.231 She
ultimately reasons, however, that such concerns are unfounded
and that an expert’s use of minority-based statistics is state
action.232 She argues that admitting minority-based statistics “is
much more likely to affect the outcome of a case.”233 But this
argument ignores the adversarial nature of civil cases.234 While
minority-based expert valuations can affect the outcome, the
other party will offer alternatives and attempt to undermine
those valuations.235 Thus, the likelihood that the injury will be
compounded because it is in court is actually lessened in the
presence of the adversarial system.236 Chamallas also contends
that the symbolic value of minority-neutral is extremely
227. See id. (explaining that race discrimination is particularly harmful).
228. See id. (noting the formal arguments against finding state action and
distinguishing Edmonson).
229. Id.
230. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1120
(1991) (“[F]or over two-thirds of the appearances by expert witnesses, there
were opposing experts in the same general area.”).
231. See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 110 (finding prudential arguments
could encourage a finding of no state action where experts use minority-based
statistics).
232. See id. (“On both formal and prudential grounds, however, I believe the
case for finding state action is strong.”).
233. Id.
234. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (explaining the importance
of adverseness “which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends”).
235. See Gross, supra note 230, at 1120 (explaining that, in a study about
expert use in trials, “most expert witnesses were disputed by similar experts for
the opposing side, and most juries had to resolve such disputes”).
236. See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (“The system assumes
that adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and
fairness.”).
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important because otherwise “it inscribes a rule of decision that
systematically undervalues the potential of women and
minorities.”237 While there is some truth to that statement, the
adversarial nature of adjudication and the jury’s knowledge that
the expert is a private, paid witness, balances out such
systematic undervaluation.238
B. The Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause prevents any state from
“deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”239 It requires states to afford all
individuals the same treatment under the law.240 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly found that race is a suspect class, and so
race-based discrimination must pass strict scrutiny to be
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.241 Strict
scrutiny requires that the race-based classification be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest by the least
restrictive means possible.242 Gender is a quasi-suspect class, and
so cases involving gender discrimination require the government
action to pass intermediate scrutiny.243 Intermediate scrutiny
237. Id.
238. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (“[O]ur legal tradition
regards the adversary process as the best means of ascertaining truth and
minimizing risk of error.”).
239. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
240. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“The central
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the
prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.”).
241. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(“[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to . . . assur[e] that the legislative body is
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. . . .
[and] ensures that the means chosen “fit” this compelling goal . . . .”); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to
say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that the courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”).
242. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“[S]uch
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further
compelling governmental interests.”).
243. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–33 (1996) (finding that
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requires the government action to be substantially related to
important government interests.244 The use of race- and ethnicitybased statistics will need to pass strict scrutiny, while genderbased statistics must pass intermediate scrutiny.245
Chamallas examines the equal protection claim and
concludes that minority-based statistics would fail even
intermediate scrutiny.246 In determining whether government
action violates equal protection under either strict scrutiny or
immediate scrutiny, the governmental interest must be weighed
against the level of discrimination imposed upon an individual.247
The governmental interest is in properly adjudicating cases and
ensuring realistic damage awards.248 The state has an important
interest in just and accurate adjudication.249 Minority-based
statistics can limit uncertainty and ensure that an accurate
damage award is given.250 The state also has an important
interest in efficient resolution of cases, and statistics can help

the government must show “exceedingly persuasive justification” for any
gender-based action, but that strict scrutiny is not required).
244. See id. at 524 (“To succeed, the defender of the challenged action must
show ‘at least that the classification serves important governmental objectives
and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.’” (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982))).
245. See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(“Equal protection in this context demands that the claimant not be subjected to
a disadvantageous life expectancy estimate solely on the basis of a ‘racial’
classification.”).
246. See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 117 (arguing that gender-based data
should be considered the same as race-based data, but that the equal protection
clause nonetheless prevents the use of either).
247. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (explaining that when
the government acts by drawing distinctions, the interest individuals have in
not being discriminated against must be weighed against the state’s objective).
248. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying discussion (discussing how
statistics are important in removing uncertainty in future lost earning
determinations).
249. See David Medine, The Constitutional Right to Expert Assistance for
Indigents in Civil Cases, 41 HASTINGS L. J. 281, 337–38 (1990) (“[T]he
government has an interest in just adjudication of its citizens’ claims.”).
250. See supra note 64 (noting cases that have used minority-based
Department of Labor statistics).
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limit the contours of damages.251 This interest, however, is not
extremely strong where the government seeks to draw
distinctions based on race.252 As Chamallas maintained:
It is not possible to anticipate every possible argument the
government may make to justify such classifications, but the
Court’s refusal (since the World War II Japanese internment
cases) to uphold any racial classification which burdens
minority members or appears to have a stigmatizing effect
would lead one to believe that few governmental interests,
other than a possible interest in protection of human life, could
justify any use of such classifications. 253

The Equal Protection Clause thus sets a high bar for any act that
draws race-based distinctions.254
While the level of scrutiny is not as stringent for genderbased statistics, a similar argument can be made that the
government interest is not strong enough to justify such
discrimination.255 As Chamallas states: “The use of gender-based
projections are premised upon highly contested cultural
assumptions. Imbedded in the projections of shorter worklife
expectancy for women is the presumption that all women will
interrupt their careers for a substantial period of time for the
purpose of child-rearing.”256 This does not mean, however, that a
court must automatically find an equal protection violation if
251. See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)
(noting the “judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies”).
252. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (“Indeed, two members of this Court have
already stated that they ‘cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose . . . which
makes the color of a person’s skin the test . . . .’” (citing McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964))); see also G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 152
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining that relying on race- and ethnicity-based statistics
“subjects the claimant to a ‘disadvantageous estimate’ of damages ‘solely on the
basis’ or ethnic classification” (citing Chamallas, supra note 31, at 75)).
253. Chamallas, supra note 31, at 112 (citing JOHN E. NOVAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 630 n.119 (4th ed. 1991)).
254. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (explaining that
equal protection requires scrutiny of governmental action because equal
treatment is core feature of the United States).
255. See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 122 (arguing that gender-based
statistics reinforce current biases).
256. Id.

HOW MUCH ARE YOU WORTH?

245

expert testimony uses minority-based statistics.257 The
government is not creating the distinctions but merely reporting
and allowing experts to utilize them.258
Chamallas argues that Palmore v. Sidoti259 foreclosed any
such argument “that reliance on race-based data is
nondiscriminatory because it merely reflects the reality of a
racially stratified workplace.”260 Palmore considered whether the
lower court was justified when it removed a white mother’s
custody rights because of potential biases her child could face
growing up with a black step-father.261 The Court concluded that
such action by the lower court was impermissible.262 The
individual interest at stake was the removal of an “infant child
from the custody of its natural mother found to be an appropriate
person to have such custody.”263 While not completely dispositive,
the court did ask the question of whether the interest in racial
harmony can possibly outweigh the interest a mother has in the
custody of her child.264 Unlike damages in a tort case, the
deprivation of parental rights is one of the strongest private
interests in this country.265 Further, when minority-based
statistics are used in a courtroom, the nature of the adversarial
257. See id. at 118 (noting that biological differences between men and
women often result in “relaxed scrutiny”).
258. See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BULBICK, supra note 101, at § 479 (“Calculations
traditionally take into account life expectancy and expected earnings. Mortality
tables are often admitted for this purpose.”).
259. See generally 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (examining whether a court could
remove a white mother’s custody rights given potential biases her child could
face from growing up with a black step-father, and concluding that such action
was impermissible).
260. Chamallas, supra note 31, at 114–15.
261. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 430–31 (setting out the issue of the case).
262. See id. at 434 (concluding that, even if there were negative effects of
growing up in a biracial home, a court cannot remove a child from a fit parent).
263. Id. at 434.
264. See id. at 433 (“The question, however, is whether the reality of private
biases and the possible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations
for removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother.”).
265. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (“[I]t [is] plain
beyond the need for multiple citation that a natural parent’s desire for and right
to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children is
an interest far more precious than any property right.” (citation omitted)).
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process makes the interest at stake much less immediate and
important.266
C. Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.”267 This clause
provides for both procedural and substantive due process.268
These two separate doctrines vary considerably. Procedural due
process is concerned with ensuring “a number of the procedural
protections contained in the Bill of Rights.”269 Substantive due
process is a doctrine that protects “liberty interests” from being
infringed.270 This doctrine, however, is extremely controversial.271
The Supreme Court at one time included economic interests
within substantive due process, but has since abandoned the
doctrine.272 In Kimpson, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s
due process rights would be violated if the expert used minoritybased statistics, but did not elaborate on the exact nature of the

266. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981)
(“[O]ur adversary system presupposes, [that] accurate and just results are most
likely to be obtained through the equal contest of opposed interests.”).
267. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
268. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (stating that “the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers both substantive and
procedural rights”).
269. Id.
270. See id. at 269–72 (noting that substantive due process typically has
been used for “marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity”
and the “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are
scarce and open-ended” (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125
(1992))).
271. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power
Through Substantive Due Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 521 (2008) (“Substantive
due process is one of the most confusing and most controversial areas of
constitutional law.”).
272. See Alexandra Klein, Note, The Freedom to Pursue a Common Calling:
Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to Occupational Licensing Statutes, 73 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 411, 422–27 (2016) (explaining Lochner and the Supreme Court’s
abandonment of economic due process).
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violation.273 This Note therefore will examine justifications under
both procedural and substantive due process.
1. Procedural Due Process
Kimpson put forth the argument that compensation in a tort
case constitutes a property right.274 It concluded that using
minority-based statistics results in denial of a plaintiff’s property
right through “arbitrary and irrational state action.”275
Procedural due process, however, allows the state to remove
property so long as proper procedures are met.276 In Mathews v.
Eldridge,277 the Court explained that when property is taken, the
court must weigh three factors: (1) the private interest; (2) the
government’s interest; and (3) the risk of property deprivation
under the current procedure and the value of procedural
safeguards.278 Full adjudication, however, is the hearing which all
others aspire to.279 Minority-based statistics are offered to the
factfinder, and the factfinder determines whether they should
apply during a full trial.280 During trial, the factfinder examines
the varying interests at stake, and fully adjudicates the issue of
damages.281 Procedural due process does not guarantee a perfect
273. See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(noting that the use of minority-based statistics is “arbitrary and irrational state
action” resulting in a “denial of due process”).
274. See id. (“There is a right—in effect a property right—to compensation
in cases of negligently caused damage to the person under state and federal
law.”).
275. Id.
276. See 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (explaining that “some form of hearing is
required before an individual is finally deprived of property”).
277. Id. at 333.
278. See id. at 335 (setting out the three factors).
279. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266–67 (1970) (finding that
although procedural due process is due before termination of welfare benefits,
the hearing need not take the form of a judicial trial).
280. See FED. R. EVID. 702 notes of advisory committee on proposed rules
(clarifying that experts are simply meant to assist the factfinder).
281. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267, 270–71 (explaining that procedural due
process requires the opportunity to be heard, the right to confront witnesses,
and reasons for the ultimate determination).
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result, but guarantees that an individual is not unjustly deprived
of property without proper procedures.282 Because the jury will
fully examine the contested issue of damages, the ultimate
adjudication is not arbitrary.283 In cases like Gary’s, where his
parents both held higher degrees, it is unlikely that factfinders
would consider the generic more likely than the individualized.284
Where individual information is compelling, there is little need
for generic statistics and judges can and have discounted them in
such cases.285 Thus, procedural due process is not implicated,
because the process protects against “arbitrary and irrational
state action.”286
2. Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process is a questionable doctrine that
“protects individual’s liberty against ‘certain government actions
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used against

282. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“This Court
consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual
is finally deprived of a property interest.”).
283. Although jury determinations are kept secret, the fact that juries are
presented with alternative amounts from both sides ensures that the ultimate
result is not arbitrary. So long as we trust juries to weigh properly presented
evidence in uncertain future damages they should be trusted to use statistics
when the individualized information is lacking. Cf. United States v. Thomas,
116 F.3d 606, 619 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The jury system incorporated in our
Constitution by the Framers was not intended to satisfy yearnings for perfect
knowledge of how a verdict is reached, . . . The jury as we know it is supposed to
reach its decisions in the mystery and security of secrecy.” (emphasis in
original)).
284. See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(“[F]or the purposes of projecting damages, the specific characteristics of the
child and his family, rather than the characterization of the child as a member
of a particular ethnic group, must be used in determining damages.”).
285. See Childs v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 1570, 1580, 1585 (S.D. Ga.
1996) (giving “limited credibility” to expert determinations based on “little more
than speculation” and favoring the evidence of temperament and family bonds).
286. See Arbitrary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[F]ounded on
prejudice or preference rather than on reason or fact.”); Irrational, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Not guided by reason or by a fair consideration of
the facts.”).
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them.’”287 To find a substantive due process violation, a
fundamental liberty interest must be identified that is “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”288 That does not
mean, however, that the liberty interest must appear in the Bill
or Rights or have been considered a liberty interest when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.289
When experts use minority-based statistics, it arguably robs
individuals of their potential.290 When a child like Gary is injured,
minority-based statistics unfairly bind the child to a future that
fails to account for his individual characteristics.291 The argument
could be made that individuals have a fundamental liberty
interest in charting their own course in life and a fundamental
liberty interest in future potential.292 This route could potentially
lead to a substantive due process violation, because minoritybased statistics shackle the child to the future of his racial or
ethnic group.293
This argument, however, ultimately falls short. As discussed
above, the procedural protections in place help to ensure that the
individual is not shackled to their racial or ethnic group.294 The
Supreme Court has also been hesitant to invoke substantive due

287. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
288. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citations omitted).
289. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847–48 (1992)
(explaining that liberty interests arise out of a “realm of personal liberty” and
certain liberty interests such as marriage do not have a textual or historical
basis).
290. See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 115 (“Looked at from an
individualistic perspective, the use of race-based data unfairly ties an individual
to the track record of his or her racial group.”).
291. See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(“Economic data that is minority-specific saddles those who do not conform to
the data with adverse generalizations about their group.”).
292. See Greenberg, supra note 30, at 429 (“Using race-based statistics
reinforces the current racial discrimination in the workforce, ignoring the
possibility and the social value of upward mobility.”).
293. See id. at 450 (“The subjective data relies on the assumption that an
individual’s achievement is limited by her genetic inheritance.”).
294. See supra notes 283–286 and accompanying text (arguing that because
factfinders consider individual factors as well as minority-based statistics the
determination is not arbitrary).
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process in recent years.295 The Court has simply stated that
“deprivation of the liberty of a person” is unconstitutional.296 But
liberty interests have traditionally been found in more concrete
and clearly defined categories.297 For example, the deprivation of
the right to marry,298 the right to control the upbringing of one’s
children,299 and the right to procreate.300 It is unlikely that such
an amorphous liberty interest—the right to chart one’s own
course in life—is “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history,” given the
inexact nature of such a concept.301 Further, as stated above,
future lost earning calculations are “necessarily speculative.”302
By using minority-based statistics, along with individual factors,
the expert is attempting to approximate a course in life that will
not be taken.303 Because of this, the expert is arguably attempting
to help navigate the injured person’s future potential. Moreover,
even if there is such an uncertain liberty interest, it is violated
when the injury occurred, not during the damage determination.

295. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“The majority never utters the dread words ‘substantive due
process,’ perhaps sensing the disrepute into which the doctrine has fallen.”).
296. Id. at 2695.
297. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992) (noting that
substantive due process, while not limited to these categories, has traditionally
been found for marriage, procreation, child rearing and education, family
relationships, and contraception).
298. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (“[T]he
right to marry is fundamental.”).
299. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“[T]he Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents
to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”).
300. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“Marriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”).
301. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724 (1997) (explaining that
broad right to personal autonomy is not a fundamental liberty interest and the
Court must look at the exact asserted right).
302. Childs v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 1570, 1578, (S.D. Ga. 1996).
303. See supra Part II (“Because damage awards are meant to compensate
the plaintiff in a close approximation of actual damages on an individual basis,
experts must be able to utilize relevant available data.”).
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V. A Statutory Alternative to a Constitutional Bar Is Proper
Under Congress’s Commerce Power
Given the tenuous finding of state action when experts use
minority-based statistics, the use of such statistics is
constitutional.304 Despite the lack of state action, the government
could pass legislation prohibiting the use of minority-based
statistics under Congress’s commerce power.305 The use is not
limited to one expert in one case, but concerns influences across
the entire United States and so arguably concerns interstate
commerce.306 If Congress could not proscribe individual experts’
use of minority-based statistics, it would undermine the purpose
of preventing experts from causing discriminatory affects across
the country.307
A. Congress’s Commerce Power is Broad Enough to Legislate
Experts
The Commerce Clause308 allows Congress to regulate
commerce that affects interstate activities.309 In Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States,310 the Supreme Court stated that Title II
of the Civil Rights Act311 was within Congress’s commerce power
304. See supra Part IV.B (explaining that state action is unlikely in a case of
private litigants hiring private experts to determine lost future earnings in civil
proceedings).
305. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (concluding that
Congress may regulate activity that “‘substantially affects’ interstate
commerce”).
306. See infra Part V.A (arguing that Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests
damage awards has a substantial affect on interstate commerce within the
modern restrictive framework).
307. Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (finding that it was within
Congress’s power to regulate marijuana across state lines, and Congress’
purpose would be frustrated if it could not regulate marijuana grown by an
individual person in one state).
308. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
309. See id. (giving Congress the power “to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes”).
310. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
311. 42 U.S.C. § 20000a (2012) (“All persons shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of the . . . accommodations of any place of public
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as applied to a single motel refusing to serve to African
Americans.312 “The only questions are (1) whether Congress had a
rational basis for finding racial discrimination, . . . and (2) if it
had such a basis, whether the means it selected to eliminate that
evil are reasonable and appropriate.”313 If Congress were to pass
legislation prohibiting the use of minority-based statistics, it
would arguably be within the commerce power.314 Not only are
the minority-based statistics compiled nationally, but the effects
of their use in individual tort cases have much broader impacts.
Tort cases are brought throughout the country, and if some states
allow minority-based statistics while others do not it could lead to
widely disparate awards resulting in an effect on plaintiffs and
defendants.315 In lead-based paint cases, eliminating disparate
awards based on race, ethnicity, and gender encourages removal
of lead-based paint in houses.316 It creates an incentive to achieve
compliance.
All individual tort cases in the U.S. create an aggregate
affect on interstate commerce.317 In Gonzales v. Raich,318 the
Court examined the question of whether the federal government
accommodation . . . without discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion,
or national origin.”).
312. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250 (finding the statute within
commerce power).
313. Id. at 258.
314. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (noting that
regulations of interstate activities have come under the Commerce Clause when
it involves “economic enterprise”).
315. Compare G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(removing ability of experts to use minority-based statistics), with Boucher v.
U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 1996) (allowing expert to use
minority-based tables).
316. Cf. McCarthy, supra note 54, at 81 (“Th[e] widespread social and
economic disparity is perpetuated, perhaps widened, when these same children,
who live among lead paint hazards largely as a result of the latent racism in
American culture, are then denied full compensation when these hazards injure
them.”).
317. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (finding that when
individual action could in the aggregate affect interstate commerce, Congress
could regulate it). But see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (“Wickard . . . is perhaps the
most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate
activity.”).
318. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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could regulate purely local cultivation of medical marijuana
pursuant the Commerce Clause.319 The Court explained that the
Commerce Clause test does not require a determination that an
individual’s “activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially
affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘rational
basis’ exists for so finding.”320 Thus, if there is a rational basis for
finding that experts’ reliance on minority-based statistics affects
interstate commerce, Congress may regulate or prohibit this
reliance.321 Rational basis is an extremely low bar, and courts are
regularly deferential to legislative findings.322 Because an
expert’s use of minority-based statistics affects damage
calculations, the aggregate impact and national character of the
statistics has a direct effect on interstate commerce.323 Further, if
their use results in lower damages for minorities and women,
individuals—particularly children—“will continue to be
inadequately compensated” for injuries.324 Because minorities will
be inadequately compensated, their valuation as “worth less”
than their non-minority counterparts will continue to permeate
the national economy.325 These reasons serve as a “rational basis”
for finding that an expert’s use of minority-based statistics has an
effect on interstate commerce.

319. See id. at 5 (presenting the issue up for consideration).
320. Id. at 22.
321. See id. at 25–26 (distinguishing from Lopez because regulation of
marijuana is “quintessentially economic”).
322. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)
(noting that courts can look to the rationale of a legislation, but, even if there is
no rationale, “the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed”).
323. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (finding that the
Commerce Clause was not implicated because the statute in question was “a
criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort
of economic enterprise”).
324. See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(explaining that, if alternatives are not used, lead-poisoned children will face
unfair compensation purely based on their race or ethnicity).
325. See Chamallas, supra note 31, at 112 (“Racial classifications . . .
produce harmful results, stigmatizing minorities as inferior and inflicting
cumulative burdens on those groups in society who are subjected to pervasive
patterns of discrimination.”).
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B. A Fair Experts Act Will Act to Prevent the Use of
Minority-Based Statistics in Damage Calculations

Given these considerations, Congress could pass legislation, a
Fair Experts Act, prohibiting experts from using minority-based
statistics. This alternative would prevent the use of
discriminatory statistics while avoiding state action problems
that arise under the Constitution.326 The best alternative is to
require that experts use minority-neutral statistics.327 Simply
removing statistics from the equation or using geographical
statistics can reinforce socioeconomic biases and fail to account
for individual potential.328 The statute should ensure that all
expert witnesses disclose their methodology and use neutral data.
A draft of a statute follows:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education to testify as to damages and
lost future earnings must use minority-neutral statistics. Such
statistics are to be used to supplement individual determinations.
For the purpose of this section—“minority-neutral statistics” are
statistics equivalent to the national average as set forth by the
United States Department of Labor.329
This statute would give “a reasonable benchmark to follow in
assessing damages.”330 While Congress could pass or alter
legislation governing the statistics themselves to remove race,

326. See supra Part IV.A (arguing that an expert’s use of minority-based
statistics is not state action).
327. See Lamb, supra note 30, at 329 (stating that gender-neutral statistics
prevents recurring discrimination and “is more relevant to the determination of
lost earning capacity”).
328. See Greenberg, supra note 30, at 449 (“Reliance on the subjective data
assumes that child-plaintiffs are restricted by the socio-economic, educational,
and vocational status of their families.”).
329. The language for this statute is derived from two sources. See FED. R.
EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise . . .”); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Sutton, 765 So. 2d 1269, 1277 (Miss.
2000) (“[T]here is a rebuttable presumption that the deceased child’s income
would have been the equivalent of the national average as set forth by the
United States Department of Labor.”).
330. Greyhound Lines, 765 So. 2d at 1277.

HOW MUCH ARE YOU WORTH?

255

ethnicity, and gender from its findings, this alternative ignores
the benefit statistics can offer outside of the courthouse.331
C. The Lead Contaminated Tap Water in Flint, Michigan, Offers a
Strong Case for Statutory Limitations on Experts’ Use of
Minority-Based Statistics.
In 2014, Flint, Michigan, switched the water supply to
residents from Lake Huron to the Flint River.332 Strapped for
cash, the city of Flint decided that it could save money by no
longer paying Detroit for water.333 Soon after the switch,
however, the tap water began to change, exhibiting a brown color
accompanying strange tastes and smells.334 City officials assured
residents that there was nothing to worry about, and for almost
two years residents paid the city for the tap water from the Flint
River.335 In August of 2015, a group of researchers “came up and
did in-home testing and found elevated levels of lead in the
drinking water.”336 It turned out that the water from the Flint
River was corrosive and was eating away at lead service pipes.337
Despite the investigation, City officials continued denying any
331. For example, Kimpson noted that such statistics can be used when
determining life expectancy for juveniles facing long prison sentences. See
G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining that
Hispanics lower life expectancy should be considered when determining whether
to put a cap on sentences for juveniles).
332. See Ganim & Tran, supra note 15 (“Nearly two years ago, the state
decided to save money by switching Flint’s water supply from Lake Huron
(which they were paying Detroit for), to the Flint River, a notorious tributary
known to locals for its filth.”).
333. See Samantha Allen, What Will Happen to Flint’s Lead-Poisoned
Children?,
THE
DAILY
BEAST
(Jan.
14,
2016),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/01/14/what-will-happen-to-flint-slead-poisoned-children.html (last visited June 5, 2016) (explaining why Flint
switched water sources) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
334. See id. (noting that the tap water “looked like urine and smell[ed] like a
sewer or fishy”).
335. See Ganim & Tran, supra note 15 (“Former Flint Mayor Dayne Walling
even drank [the water] on local TV to make the point [that the water was
safe].”).
336. Id.
337. See id. (explaining the source of lead in Flint tap water).
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problems, until one pediatrician investigated and found
extremely high levels of lead in the blood of toddlers.338
Several individuals have filed suit, claiming that Flint failed
to follow federal law and that officials knew of the problem but
failed to notify city residents.339 Residents are suing because lead
poisoned children “may have suffered irreversible damage to their
developing brains and nervous systems.”340 The population of
Flint is predominantly African-American; in 2010 56.6% of the
population was Black, and 37.4% was white.341 The population is
also predominantly lower income with a median household
income of $24,834.342 If minority-based statistics are used, the
children of Flint will receive disparate awards regardless of the
fact that the injuries are identical and they all live in the same
city.343 If the proposed statute were applied, however, the
individualized information would be supplemented by
minority-neutral statistics based on the national average. This
would ensure more equivalent outcomes. Applying the statute
would also ensure that children born in Flint are not undervalued
because of where they were born. Using statistics based on a
national average avoids “the possible perpetuation of
inappropriate stereotypes, especially where the defendants have
deprived their victims of the chance to excel in life beyond
predicted statistical averages.”344 If, instead of the proposed
338. See id. (“Lead levels doubled and even tripled in some cases.”).
339. See id. (noting that federal law required water treatment with an
“anti-corrosive agent” that was not used and that residents “were kept in the
dark for 18 months”).
340. Abby Goodnough, Flint Weighs Scope of Harm to Children Caused by
Lead
in
Water,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan
29,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/30/us/flint-weighs-scope-of-harm-to-childrencaused-by-lead-in-water.html?_r=0 (last visited June 5, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
341. Flint (City), Michigan, State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/2629000.html (last visited
June 5, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
342. Id.; see also Ganim & Tran, supra note 15 (“According to local officials,
about 40% of residents are below the poverty rate.”).
343. Because more children in Flint are African-American, they would
receive lower damages than the white children, which make up a smaller
population.
344. G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
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statute, minority-based statistics were found unconstitutional,
lower socioeconomic status would always result in lower damage
awards. This is because “the United States Constitution includes
no express protection of socioeconomic rights. Nor has the U.S.
Supreme Court either deemed such rights fundamental for
purposes of review under the Constitution nor found poverty to be
a classification, like race, that deserves searching equalprotection analysis.”345 Yet just as race can “unfairly tie[] an
individual to the track record of his or her racial group,” so too
can a socioeconomic group.346 The proposed statute would
eliminate minority-based statistics and attempt to compensate
individuals for their lost potential—as far as money can.
VI. Conclusion
The use of minority-based statistics is unreliable and
inherently problematic. When experts use such statistics, it is
unlikely to result in accurate figures and fails to account for the
uncertainties in life. As one court so aptly put it:
Any one of us who has attended a 40th, or even 50th, reunion
of a grade school or high school or college class can attest to
the unpredictability of life. Some of the most charismatic and
promising of our then colleagues died young, or suffered long
illness or suffered through other unfortunate and unhappy
events. Others, perhaps even those deemed least likely to
succeed, have led rather successful, apparently useful
lives. Very few members of the human race in our great
country, whether male or female, white or black or yellow, of
whatever ethnic composition, escape the unpredictable
vagaries of life. Life’s cup is both half empty and half full.347

Because of the uncertainty of life, many experts have relied
on minority-based statistics as a way to ensure a more realistic
and appropriate number. These statistics, however, fail to
345. Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of
Race and Class in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109,
109 (Fall 2009).
346. Chamallas, supra note 31, at 115.
347. Childs v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 1570, 1579 (S.D. Ga. 1996).
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account for the “unpredictable vagaries of life” and can lead to
inadequate compensation by limiting individual potential.
Yet, the fact that these statistics are unreliable does not
mean they are unconstitutional. Experts use these statistics on
behalf of the plaintiff or the defendant, the other side is able to
rebut the evidence, and it is up to the factfinder to decide if the
numbers properly account for the uncertainty inherent in future
predictions. The court need not endorse the expert’s calculation so
long as it is based on “sufficient facts or data.”348 The argument
that this constitutes state action is questionable at best.
That does not mean, however, that experts should continue
to use minority-based statistics. It is well within Congress’s
power to regulate private individuals when there are interstate
effects. By passing a Fair Experts Act, Congress can ensure that
experts do not use minority-based statistics. It will ensure that
individuals are not bound by the effects of past discrimination
while accounting for the potential children have to overcome the
odds. Courts must be cautious about intruding on the domain of
the political branches. While it is tempting for courts to “legislate
from the bench,” our country is a democracy, and lawmaking is
more properly left to Congress. Through Congress, past injustice
need not influence the recovery of individuals injured—often
through no fault of their own—and can close the gap towards
making them whole.

348.
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